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ABSTRACT
Most economic activity occurs in cities. This creates a tension between local increasing returns,
implied by the existence of cities, and aggregate constant returns, implied by balanced growth. To
address this tension, we develop a theory of economic growth in an urban environment. We show
that the urban structure is the margin that eliminates local increasing returns to yield constant returns
to scale in the aggregate, which is sufficient to deliver balanced growth. In a multi-sector economy
with specific factors and productivity shocks, the same mechanism leads to a city size distribution
that is well described by a power distribution with coefficient one: Zipf's Law. Under certain
assumptions our theory produces Zipf's Law exactly. More generally, it produces the systematic
deviations from Zipf's Law observed in the data, including the under-representation of small cities
and the absence of very large ones. In general, the model identifies the standard deviation of industry
productivity shocks as the key parameter determining dispersion in the city size distribution. We
present evidence that the relationship between the dispersion of city sizes and the variance of











Aggregate economic activity is primarily urban economic activity. For example, in
the United States at the turn of the millennium, 80% of the population lived in urban
agglomerations, and they earned around 85% of income. This fact creates a tension.
On the one hand, the organization of economic activity in cities is evidence for the
presence of scale eﬀects: there are economic rewards to the agglomeration of ﬁrms
and individuals in a city. On the other hand, scale does not appear to be rewarded
in the aggregate, as suggested by the evidence on balanced growth. In this paper we
argue that it is the urban structure — the number and size of cities — that resolves
this tension.
In the absence of aggregate constant returns to scale, long run growth rates in
income per capita either explode or tend to zero.1 An endogenous urban structure
is, however, suﬃcient to generate balanced growth in the presence of local increasing
returns. To see this, note that the size of cities is determined by the trade-oﬀ between
agglomeration eﬀects and congestion costs. In our theory, this trade-oﬀ is aﬀected by
the stock of factors and the level of productivity. As the economy expands, keeping
factor proportions and productivity levels constant, each city operates at the equilib-
rium size and the economy behaves as if using a constant returns to scale technology
by varying the number of cities. In this way, it is the evolution of the urban struc-
ture that produces linear aggregate production functions in a world with urban scale
eﬀects.
Theories that use this mechanism to generate balanced growth face the challenge
of being consistent with a number of well-established empirical regularities about the
size distribution of cities. To address these facts, we embed this mechanism in a
multi-sector economy with industry speciﬁc factors and productivity shocks in which
1Speciﬁcally, the production set of the aggregate economy is, asymptotically, a convex cone. In
both exogenous growth models, and endogenous growth models such as Lucas (1988), scale economies
at the industry level are transformed into constant returns at the aggregate by assuming linear factor
accumulation technologies (see also Jones (1999)).
2the size distribution of cities depends on the allocation of industries across cities.
The growth, birth and death of these cities in turn depends upon the evolution of
productivity shocks and the way they are propagated through the accumulation of
industry speciﬁc factors. We show that under two polar sets of assumptions this
mechanism delivers the stylized empirical regularity known as Zipf’s Law of cities:
The rank of a city is inversely proportional to its size. Zipf’s Law is, however, only
an approximate description of the data. To address these discrepancies, we analyze
the implications of our theory away from these two polar cases and show that the
mechanism delivers precisely the systematic deviations from Zipf’s Law observed in
the data.
The main step in establishing the implications of our theory for city size distrib-
utions is to demonstrate the ability of this mechanism to produce Gibrat’s Law of
cities: the mean and variance of the growth rate of a city are independent of its
size. In our framework, cities result out of the trade-oﬀ between commuting costs
and local production externalities in human capital and labor. Industry speciﬁce x -
ternalities imply that cities specialize in an industry, and so all cities operating in
an industry have the same size. The interaction between commuting costs and the
urban production externality leads to a city size that varies only with changes in the
average product of labor in the city (and hence industry). In response to a positive
productivity shock, cities grow, and the number of cities operating in an industry
falls as long as employment in the industry changes less than proportionately.
To see how the mechanism generates Gibrat’s Law, ﬁrst consider a simple economy
in which the only factors of production are labor and human capital both growing at
constant rates. In such an economy, the growth rate of the average product of labor,
and hence the size of cities, is driven by the growth rate of total factor productivity.
Therefore, if shocks are permanent, the growth process of cities is scale independent.
Conversely, in an economy in which human capital and labor do not grow and the
production function is linear in capital (an AK model), temporary productivity shocks
imply permanent changes in the capital stock, the average product of labor, and hence
3also in the size of cities. In this case, we also obtain a scale independent growth
process for cities. After establishing Gibrat’s Law for these polar cases, we combine
the growth, entry, and exit processes to show that, in these cases, the invariant
distribution of city sizes satisﬁes Zipf’s Law.2
Apart from these polar cases, productivity shocks aﬀect the distribution of city
sizes both directly and indirectly through their eﬀect on factor accumulation. This
implies a scale dependent growth process for cities. The bulk of the paper is devoted
to a study of the interaction of these eﬀects and their ability to produce a number of
robust deviations from Zipf’s Law observed in the data. One of the most notable is
that, relative to Zipf’s Law, small cities are under-represented and the largest cities
are not ‘large enough.’ A second is that there is some systematic variation in the
dispersion of city sizes across countries. We show that our theory is able to produce
these robust deviations from Zipf’s Law in between the two polar cases discussed
above. Industries with small stocks of speciﬁc capital operate in small cities. For
these industries, diminishing returns to physical capital lead to high rates of return,
high incentives to accumulate industry speciﬁc capital, and hence a high growth rate
for cities operating in this industry. This logic implies that growth rates decrease with
size, which we show leads to the under-representation of small cities and the absence
of very large ones. We also show that the model identiﬁes the standard deviation of
industry productivity shocks as the key element determining dispersion in the size
distribution of cities across countries.
This paper draws from four related literatures. The ﬁrst is the extensive literature
on endogenous growth spawned by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990). In this literature,
as emphasized by Jones (1999), the treatment of scale eﬀects is crucial, as it is the
imposition of linearity in the aggregate production technology that is necessary for
2The relationship between Gibrat’s Law and Zipf’s Law has been previously studied in both the
physics (for example, Levy and Solomon (1996), Malcai, Biham and Solomon (1999), and Blank and
Solomon (2000)) and economics (for example, Gabaix (1999a) and Cordoba (2003)) literatures. In
contrast to these papers, our proof emphasizes the interaction between Gibrat’s Law and the process
of entry and exit in producing Zipf’s Law.
4the existence of balanced growth. Where our paper diﬀers is in its utilization of the
urban structure as the vehicle for obtaining this linearity.
A second related literature is the small number of papers on urban growth. Black
and Henderson (1999) and Eaton and Eckstein (1997) both present deterministic
urban growth models with two types of cities in which, along the balanced growth
path, both cities grow at the same rate. Unlike both of these papers, ours focuses
on a stochastic environment and introduces a rich industrial structure which allows
us to characterize the evolution of the entire size distribution of cities over time.
In addition, both of these papers obtain the linearity of the aggregate production
process by assuming knife-edge conditions on production and externality parameters.
In contrast, in our theory the urban structure produces this linearity without any
further conditions on parameter values.






















Following the original paper of Auerbach (1913), a substantial literature has arisen
that investigates the empirical foundations of Zipf’s Law. A number of authors,
including Rosen and Resnick (1980), Dobkins and Ioannides (2000), Ioannides and
Overman (2001), and Soo (2003) have documented the robustness of this phenomenon
5both over time and across countries. This is illustrated in Figure One for the United
States, where Zipf’s Law appears to be as good a description of the size distribution of
cities at the turn of the Twenty-First century as it was at the turn of the Twentieth.
Further, as illustrated in Figures Two A and B, Zipf’s Law also appears to be a good















































Much recent empirical work on the size distribution of cities (surveyed in Gabaix
and Ioannides (2003)) has emphasized the fact that there are systematic deviations
from Zipf’s Law. One of the most robust is the under-representation of small cities
and the absence of very large ones, which is illustrated in Figures One and Two as a
broad tendency for the relationship to be slightly concave, at least once one controls
for a country’s capital city (see also Eeckhout (2004)). A second, as shown in Figure
Two, is that some countries have a size distribution that is more or less dispersed than
that predicted by Zipf’s Law, which is reﬂected in ﬂatter or steeper plots of log-rank
against log-size. These deviations from Zipf’s Law are precisely the ones emphasized
in the discussion above.
6Finally, this paper is related to a number of proposed explanations of Zipf’s Law.
A large number of papers, including most notably Champernowne (1953), Kalecki
(1945), Levy and Solomon (1996), Malcai, Biham and Solomon (1999), Gabaix (1999a),
Blank and Solomon (2000) and Cordoba (2003), have studied statistical processes that
generate Zipf’s Law. In economics, Gabaix (1999a,b), Cordoba (2003) and Eeckhout
(2004) have presented models in which cities grow as labor migrates as the direct
response to city amenity, taste or productivity shocks. Neither paper generates the
existence of cities endogenously, and in all three the city growth process directly in-
herits the behavior of the exogenously speciﬁed shocks. In a recent study, Duranton
(2002) presents a quality ladder model of growth which, under certain assumptions
on the location and mobility of new ﬁrms, produces a size distribution of cities that
matches some aspects of the data. In contrast, our paper focuses upon the relationship
between factor accumulation, productivity shocks and the urban structure. Impor-
tantly, it is endogenous city formation that both eliminates scale eﬀects in growth
and provides an alternative theory of the size distribution of cities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model.
Section 3 derives the main results of the paper on growth, Zipf’s Law, and deviations
from Zipf’s Law. Section 4 illustrates the results of the model numerically and com-
pares them to data from several countries. Section 5 concludes. An appendix contains
the basic elements of the decentralization and proofs of the main propositions.
2. AN URBAN GROWTH MODEL
Consider an economy in which production occurs at speciﬁc locations that we call
cities. Firms set up in a city, hiring capital and employing workers. Agglomeration
results from a positive production externality on labor and human capital. Agents
reside in cities and commute to work. Households are made up of workers who con-
sume, accumulate industry speciﬁc physical capital to be used in each industry, and
devote their time to working and learning so as to accumulate industry speciﬁch u m a n
capital. We assume log-linear preferences and Cobb-Douglas production functions so
7that both the growth path and the city size distribution can be solved in closed form.
Cities
Our approach to modeling cities follows the classic paper of Henderson (1974)
and has been used in the urban growth model of Black and Henderson (1999). We
consider a world in which there are a large number of potential city sites. Cities are
monocentric, with all production occurring at the single exogenously given central
business district (CBD). It is assumed that every agent that works at the CBD must
reside in the area surrounding the city. Locations closer to the CBD are more desirable
because they involve a shorter commute to work. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the
cost of commuting is linear in the distance travelled, and we let τ b et h ec o s tp e rm i l e
of commuting in terms of the output of the city.
All agents consume the services of one unit of land per period. In order for agents to
be indiﬀerent about where to live in the city, rents diﬀer by the amount of commuting
costs, with rents on the city edge equal to zero. Therefore, in a city of radius ¯ z, rents
at a distance z from the center must be given by
R(z)=τ (¯ z − z).









Since everyone in the city lives in one unit of land, a city of population n has a
















where b ≡ 2π−1







8with each resident of the city paying a total of 3bn
1
2/2 in terms of rents and commut-
ing costs. Note that both total and average commuting costs are increasing in city
population.
Firms
Production occurs in ﬁrms that face a constant returns to scale technology. The
production of a representative ﬁrm in industry j l o c a t e di na na r b i t r a r yc i t ya ta n y







where ˜ Atj is the total factor productivity of an urban ﬁrm (given that good j is
produced in that city), ktj is the amount of industry j speciﬁc capital used by that
ﬁrm, htj i st h ea m o u n to fh u m a nc a p i t a l ,a n dntj is the number of workers employed
in a ﬁrm, each of whom spends a fraction utj of his or her time at work.
There is a local industry speciﬁc externality in the labour input, so that the pro-
ductivity of any ﬁrm in the city depends upon the number of workers in a city and
the amount of human capital they have





where Atj is an industry speciﬁc productivity shock and ˜ Htj and ˜ Ntj represent the
total stock of human capital and the total amount of labor in the city. Increasing
returns at the city level cause agglomeration in the model. Firms are assumed to be
small, taking the size of the externality as given. The industry speciﬁcp r o d u c t i v i t y
shock is ﬁnite order Markov and is distributed according to a density function with
ﬁnite moments.
We divide the original set of J industries into groups. Within a group, ﬁrms in each
industry produce using exactly the same technology, but use industry speciﬁch u m a n
and physical capital, and receive industry speciﬁc productivity shocks. Across groups,
all aspects of the technology may diﬀer. In line with much of the literature, we see
9this as a natural way of organizing the set of products observed in the economy. Some
products are distinguished because they are produced with fundamentally diﬀerent
technologies, while others embody diﬀerent designs or fulﬁll diﬀerent purposes, but are
produced with the same ex-ante technology. We use the homogeneity of technology
within a group to establish the conditions under which Zipf’s Law holds for each of
these groups. We then aggregate across groups to obtain Zipf’s Law for the entire
economy.
Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical small households. The
initial number of people per household is N0, and we assume that the population of
each household grows exogenously at rate gN. Each household starts with the same
strictly positive endowments of industry j speciﬁc physical (Kj0) and human (Hj0)
capital.

















where δ is a discount factor that lies strictly between zero and 1/(1 + gN), and Ctj
denotes a sequence of state contingent consumption of each good j. Here E0 is an
expectation operator conditional on all information available to the household at
time zero.
Capital services in industry j are proportional to the stock of industry j-speciﬁc






Investment in industry j, Xj, is assumed to be denominated in terms of that industry’s
consumption good.
Each member of the household is endowed with one unit of time in each period,
10which can be devoted to either the accumulation of human capital or the provision
of labor services in each of the j industries. In order to work in industry j, am e m b e r
o ft h eh o u s e h o l dm u s tb ep h y s i c a l l yp r e s e n t( a tt h es t a r to ft h ep e r i o d )a tal o c a t i o n
that produces good j. Hence we can think of the household distributing Nj of its

















j are positive constants. This speciﬁcation allows us to nest both
endogenous and exogenous growth within the same framework. If B1
j =0 ,t h e nh u m a n
capital evolves exogenously at a constant rate B0
j a n dw eh a v ea ne x o g e n o u sg r o w t h
model. If B1
j is positive, then the time allocation of a worker aﬀects the growth rate
of the economy, which results in an endogenous growth model. The assumption of
linearity is made for simplicity, but is not necessary to generate balanced growth in
this model since, as we will show below, the economy exhibits constant returns to
scale in the aggregate.
Eﬃcient allocations
All Pareto eﬃcient allocations are the solution of the following Social Planning
Problem: Choose state contingent sequences
©
















subject to, for all t and j,
Ctj + Xtj + b ˜ N
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µtj ˜ Ntj, (3)
Ktj = µtj ˜ Ktj, (4)















The ﬁrst constraint states that consumption plus investment plus commuting costs
has to be less than or equal to production in all cities in the industry, where µtj
denotes the number of cities in industry j at time t.
The original problem is not a convex dynamic optimization problem. However,
since the city size problem is static, we can solve it separately and transform the
problem into a convex dynamic optimization problem. This allows us to prove the
existence of a unique Pareto eﬃcient allocation below.
Decentralization
In order to explain the observed city size distributions, it is necessary to consider
also competitive equilibrium allocations. It is easy to introduce a competitive equi-
librium framework for which the unique equilibrium allocation attains the solution of
the Social Planning Problem. As is standard in the previous literature, we use city
developers that internalize the urban production externality.
We follow Henderson (1974) and postulate the existence of a class of competitive
property developers that own each potential city site and compete to attract workers
and ﬁrms. Property developers aim to maximize total rents from their land. In order
to attract ﬁrms and workers to the city, developers may subsidize the employment of
all factors of production (although they never choose to subsidize physical capital as
there is no externality in physical capital). Agents derive utility out of consumption
of goods that are costlessly tradable, and so they live in the city if their income, net
of commuting costs, is larger than what they could obtain elsewhere. Firms produce
12in the city as long as proﬁts are nonnegative. Free entry implies that developers earn
zero proﬁts in equilibrium. Solving this problem results in city sizes that are optimal.
Given the size of the industry, this means that we must allow for the possibility of
a non-integer number of cities, all of which are identical in size within an industry.
Since developers are fully internalizing the external eﬀect, the equilibrium allocation
is eﬃcient.
It is important to stress that in this formulation developers choose to subsidize
human capital independently of the subsidy to labor, and that this subsidy is on
the employment, but not the accumulation, of human capital. This distinction is
important, since free mobility restricts the ability of developers to extract the beneﬁts
of subsidies to human capital accumulation. Some examples of policies that may
achieve this goal in practice are subsidies to ﬁrms that employ high skilled workers,
or the provision of local public goods preferred by highly educated agents (e.g. ﬁne
arts)3.
The next two propositions establish uniqueness of the Pareto eﬃcient allocation,
and the analogs of both Welfare Theorems. Apart from the developers problem, the
proofs of these propositions are standard. The details of the developers problem are
presented in the appendix. The full decentralization and a detailed proof of these
propositions can be found in Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2003).
Proposition 1 Every competitive equilibrium in this economy is Pareto eﬃcient.
Proposition 2 There exists a competitive equilibrium that attains the unique Pareto
eﬃcient allocation.
3. CHARACTERIZATION
W i t ht h e s er e s u l t si nh a n d ,w ea r ef r e et om a k eu s eo ft h es o l u t i o nt ot h es o c i a l
planning problem in order to characterize the competitive equilibrium of the model.
3See Black and Henderson (1999) for a discussion of the diﬃculties in implementing this type of
subsidy.
13We now proceed to derive several properties of the equilibrium allocation. Due to our
functional form assumptions, we are able to solve for the entire equilibrium growth
path and size distribution of cities in closed form.
Aggregate Constant Returns
The problem of choosing the optimal sizes of cities is static: The planner sets the
city size to maximize output net of commuting costs. We solve this problem ﬁrst and
then, imposing the solution, we solve for the dynamics. Toward this, we can rewrite
the resource constraint in an industry j at time t as a function of industry-wide
variables and the number of cities in an industry,

















The ﬁrst order condition with respect to µtj yields the optimal number of cities in


















Notice that we need to impose




since otherwise total commuting costs would be larger than total output in the indus-
try (this assumption also guarantees that the ﬁrst order condition is necessary and



















and notice that if the above condition is not satisﬁed, as the number of cities decreases,
given industry aggregates, the value of the expression increases unboundedly. This
14implies that the above problem has no internal solution: The planner would like to
make cities as large as possible.
Substituting the results for the optimal number of cities and total commuting costs
in the resource constraint implies that








tj ≡ ˆ Ytj, (10)
where















ˆ Atj = A
1
1−2(γj+εj)











¢, and ˆ φj =





Since, under our assumptions utj ≤ 1 is constant in equilibrium, output net of
commuting costs for the optimal city structure (ˆ Ytj) is constant returns to scale in
industry aggregates. Notice that by equation (9) output in the industry is also a
constant returns to scale function of inputs in the industry.
The constraint in (10) contains the ﬁrst main result of our paper: introducing the
margin of the creation of new cities eliminates increasing returns at the urban level
from the aggregate problem. We summarize this result in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 (Aggregate Constant Returns to Scale) Output in industry j, Ytj, and
industry output net of commuting costs, ˆ Ytj, are constant returns to scale functions
of industry speciﬁcc a p i t a lKtj, industry speciﬁc human capital Htj, and labor Ntj.
T h er e s u l ti nt h i sP r o p o s i t i o nh a si m p l i c a t i o n sf o rt h ew a yi nw h i c hw ev i e wt h e
growth process. First, it allows us to reconcile the coexistence of cities, which implies
the existence of scale economies, with balanced growth. Second, it shows that it is
inappropriate to test for the existence of increasing returns with aggregate data even
15though increasing returns are, in fact, present in the production technology. Third,
the observed level of aggregate productivity (the magnitude of Fj in equation (10))
is determined by the way production is organized in cities, as well as the parame-
ters governing externalities and commuting costs. This suggests the possibility that
diﬀerences in the pattern of urbanization are the source of diﬀerences in total factor
productivity across countries4. As productivity shocks are likely to be more frequent
than changes in these patterns, one could in principle decompose their eﬀect on total
factor productivity empirically. To clarify this last point, suppose that cities are or-
ganized at a suboptimal size, either too large or too small, captured by a parameter


































which, as can be easily checked, has a global optimum at κj =1 . Hence, by organizing
cities ineﬃciently (too small or too large), the economy would produce with lower
total factor productivity. In what follows we set κj =1 , since it does not aﬀect any
of the urban or growth implications of the model.
City Sizes
To understand the process of city size determination, rewrite the ﬁrst order condi-














4Au and Henderson (2002) examines this possibility for the particular case of China.
16That is, the planner increases the number of people in the city until the change in
commuting costs per person for current residents (left hand side) is equal to the
change in earnings per person for current residents (right hand side).
From this equation it is easy to see that anything that increases the level of the
average product of labor increases the average size of the city. For example, consider
the eﬀect of an increase in productivity. Everything else equal, output per worker
increases and the planner ﬁnds it optimal to attract more workers to the city. If the
productivity increase is permanent, the city will be permanently larger. The growth
model presented above is, in essence, a mechanism for producing persistence in the
average product of labor in a city, while at the same time remaining consistent with
aggregate growth facts.
Our mechanism relies on city sizes that respond to factor accumulation and pro-
ductivity shocks. This is the case as long as average commuting costs do not rise
by exactly the same amount as the average product of labor. If commuting costs
were to rise by less, or even more, than the average product of labor, the basic result
that productivity shocks are translated into ﬂuctuations in city size remains. How-
ever, one combination of assumptions that does not work is if commuting costs are
denominated purely in units of time, and workers supply labor inelastically, and the
production function is Cobb-Douglas. In this knife-edge case, marginal and average
products are proportional and hence commuting costs measured as forgone wages
rise at exactly the same rate as the average product of labor. More generally, any
combination of time and material cost of commuting yields the necessary response of
city sizes to productivity shocks. In the model above we focus on a simple case in
which commuting costs within a city are denominated in terms of the output of that
city. The results are analogous if we include time costs of commuting as well.
Growth Rates
To solve for the dynamics of factor accumulation, note that after substituting for
the optimal number of cities we obtain a standard dynamic problem with constant
17returns to scale production technology. In particular, our problem becomes one of
choosing {Ctj,X tj,N tj,u tj,K tj,H tj}
∞,J
t=0,j=1 so as to maximize (1) subject to (10),
(3), (6), and (7). The value function of the planner has the form















which is the result of the particular log-linear speciﬁcation we have assumed. We
could set up a more general model at the cost of losing the ability to solve the model
analytically. The details of the solution are entirely standard and are suppressed.5
Three basic results are immediate. The share of population working in each industry
is constant. Investment is a constant share of output net of commuting costs
Xtj = xj ˆ Ytj,
for some constant xj, and the fraction of time used for production is constant at u∗
j.
Note that the model is capable of producing growth, either exogenously or endoge-
nously. More importantly, the model delivers two properties not present in most other
urban growth models: a balanced growth path exists without knife-edge assumptions
on the size of externalities, and growth is positive even in the absence of population
growth. On the balanced growth path (with no uncertainty) we know that the growth
rates of capital (gKj), human capital (gHj), and output net of commuting costs (gˆ Yj)
are constant, so
gKt+1j ≡ lnKt+1j − lnKtj =( 1− ωj)
h
lnxj +l nˆ Ytj
i
− (1 − ωj)lnKtj.
Hence, on the balanced growth path ln ˆ Ytj − lnKtj is constant. The growth rate of
human capital is given by
gHj = B
0









1 − ˆ αj − ˆ βj
´
gN
1 − ˆ βj
.
5The details are contained in Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2003).
6For the case when ˆ βj =1 , gN = gH =0 , and ω =0(the AK model), gˆ Yt+1j =l nxj +ln(FjAtj).
18That is, in the long run, growth is driven by endogenous human capital accumulation
(if B1
j > 0) and exogenous population growth.
Notice that in this model linearity in human capital accumulation implies that
growth rates are constant in the long run, even with increasing returns in the aggregate
production function. In general, this type of linearity plays two diﬀerent roles in
growth models: It is a source of endogenous growth, and it prevents growth rates
from diverging to inﬁn i t y . I nt h i sp a p e r ,t h i sl i n e a r i t ys e r v e st h eﬁrst and not the
second purpose. We use it to show that our results do not depend on the source of
growth and, in particular, whether it is exogenous or endogenous. To illustrate this
point, suppose we set 1 <α j +βj +γj for all j, and we let human capital accumulate
exactly as physical capital. Then, without cities, due to the presence of aggregate
increasing returns, growth rates would diverge to inﬁnity. However, with this type of
increasing returns at the city level, the mechanism we have introduced in this paper
would yield constant returns in the aggregate and therefore a balanced growth path
in which gˆ Yj = gN.
Gibrat’s and Zipf’s Laws
Given the evolution of output in each industry, we can study the evolution of the












= 2[ln(At+1j) − ln(Atj)] − 2
³













+2ˆ βj [ln(Kt+1j) − ln(Ktj)].
Recursively substituting for capital growth, we get an expression for the long run













1 − ˆ βj
[gHj − gN] + 2[ln(At+1j) − ln(Atj)]

















Equation (11) is the key equation for characterizing city dynamics. From this
equation we can deduce conditions under which Gibrat’s Law is guaranteed for each
group of industries. We can then show that Gibrat’s Law implies Zipf’s Law in our
framework once we modify the results on the convergence of the growth process in
Levy and Solomon (1996) and Malcai, Biham and Solomon (1999) to allow for the
entry and exit of cities.
In order to generate Gibrat’s Law, and Zipf’s Law as an invariant distribution, we
need the growth processes at the city level to be independent of scale. As labor is
perfectly mobile across cities and industries, this in turn requires that the marginal
product of labor be independent of scale. The proposition below outlines two scenarios
in which this is exactly the case: the ﬁrst is one in which current productivity shocks
are the only stochastic force in growth and are permanent, thus producing permanent
increases in the level of the marginal product of labor, so that the growth rate of the
marginal product is independent of scale7. These assumptions eliminate the third
term in equation (11) and therefore all scale dependence. This result is invariant
to whether the engine of growth is endogenous or exogenous. The second case is
one in which productivity shocks are temporary, but have a permanent eﬀect on the
marginal product of labor through the linear accumulation of physical capital. This
7This is essentially the mechanism at work in Gabaix (1999a,b), Cordoba (2003) and Eeckhout
(2004) for an exogenous number of cities. Gabaix (1999a) and Cordoba (2003) impose lower bounds
on city sizes and a particular structure on the shocks that leads to an urban structure described by
a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one. Eeckhout (2004) has permanent productivity shocks that
lead, without a lower bound via the Central Limit Theorem, to a log-normal distribution for city
sizes. The economic interpretation of the shocks diﬀer in all three cases.
20amounts to transforming the model into an AK model with no human capital and
100% depreciation. In this context, both last period output and capital react linearly
to last period shocks. These two eﬀects cancel out, and the only remaining source of
uncertainty is the contemporaneous productivity shock.8
The next proposition formalizes these arguments and proves the link between
Gibrat’s Law and Zipf’s Law in the model. In the proof of the proposition, we use the
assumption that our industries can be divided into groups with similar technologies
to ﬁrst prove that Zipf’s Law holds for each group. We then aggregate across groups
to show Zipf’s Law for the entire economy. The proof of this result requires us to
impose an arbitrarily small lower bound on the size of a city (as in Gabaix 1999a).
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 4 (Exact Gibrat’s Law and Zipf’s Law) The growth process of city sizes
satisﬁes Gibrat’s Law, and the invariant distribution for city sizes satisﬁes Zipf’s Law,
if and only if one of the following two conditions is satisﬁed:
1. (No physical capital) There is no physical capital
³
ˆ βj =0or ωj =1
´
, and pro-
ductivity shocks are permanent.
2. (AK model) City production is linear in physical capital and there is no human
capital
³
ˆ αj =0 , ˆ βj =1
´
, depreciation is 100% (ωj =0 ), and productivity shocks
are temporary.
Scale Dependence
Obviously, the conditions outlined in Proposition 4 are restrictive. Reality surely
lies between these two extremes: capital is a factor of production, but not the only
one. The question that arises is: Between these two extremes, how close are the
8Note that if we were to allow inﬁnite order Markov processes for Aj,w ec o u l dﬁne tune the
speciﬁcation of the process so as to yield Zipf’s Law exactly for any parameter set.
21predictions of the model to observed urban structures? As mentioned in the intro-
duction, an extensive empirical literature (surveyed in Gabaix and Ioannides (2003))
has uncovered two systematic departures from Zipf’s Law. First, plots of log-rank
against log-size are concave, reﬂecting the fact that small cities are underrepresented
and that big cities are not ‘big enough.’ Second, there is some variation in cross coun-
try estimates of Zipf’s coeﬃcients, with this variation positively correlated with per
capita income: richer countries have a more even city size distribution (Soo (2003)).
In the next two Propositions we argue that, in general, the model produces these
same deviations from Zipf’s Law. First we show that if a city is relatively large because
it operates in an industry that experienced a history of above average productivity
shocks, it can be expected to grow slower than average in the future, while the opposite
is true of small cities. Intuitively, since ˆ β<1, diminishing returns to capital imply
that industries with high capital stocks have a lower return to capital than industries
with low capital stocks, and so cities in industries with relatively low stocks of physical
capital grow faster. This eﬀect is emphasized by the fact that when ωj > 0 for all
j, in order to keep physical capital constant, industry investments have to be higher
in industries with large capital stocks and lower in industries with low capital stocks.
Urban growth rates exhibit reversion to the mean. This implies that the log rank-
size relationship will in general (apart from particular realizations of the shocks) be
concave or, in other words, that the invariant distribution for city sizes has thinner
tails than a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one. Eeckhout (2004) emphasizes
exactly this feature of the data.
Proposition 5 (Concavity) If conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed,
the growth rate of cities exhibits reversion to the mean. If productivity levels are




for all t,j), then there exists a unique invariant distribution of city sizes with thinner
tails than a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one.
Unless the conditions of Proposition 4 are satisﬁed, variation in the standard de-
22viation of productivity shocks aﬀects the distribution of city sizes. Intuitively, given
capital stocks, a larger standard deviation of shocks implies a larger standard devia-
tion of city sizes and a larger standard deviation of investments, which in turn implies
a more dispersed distribution of capital stocks. This would explain the positive cor-
relation between Zipf’s coeﬃcients and income, documented in Soo (2003), if high
income countries experience less volatile shocks. We formalize this intuition in the
following proposition.
Proposition 6 If conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed, the standard
deviation of city sizes increases with the standard deviation of industry shocks.
Proposition 6 points to the standard deviation of productivity shocks as the key
parameter linking our model with the observed urban structure. In the next section
we explore whether the international evidence on Zipf’s coeﬃcients is consistent with
the evidence on the volatility of industry productivity shocks.
4. NUMERICAL EXERCISES
This section illustrates the characterization of the urban structure presented in the
previous section. Summarizing, we obtain Zipf’s Law exactly if we either eliminate
capital or make capital accumulation linear; in all other cases the log rank-size re-
lationship is concave and the absolute value of the slope is negatively related to the
variance of industry shocks. All the results we have presented are asymptotic; for any
particular realization of the stochastic process there may be random deviations from
Zipf’s Law. This is illustrated in Figure Three, where we simulate the model for 100
identical industries for the case of ωj =1for all j =1 ,...,J and permanent shocks
(Case 1 of Proposition 4). Along a given sample path, Zipf’s Law holds exactly, apart
from stochastic deviations.
The next step is to illustrate the deviations of Zipf’s Law obtained in our model
when we move away from the assumptions in Proposition 4. Figure Four presents
U.S. data in 2002 for MSAs, together with a numerical simulation of the model with
23transitory shocks. We let the model run for 10,000 periods so that the distribution
of city sizes is not changing signiﬁcantly through time.
As one can see in Figure Four, the model does very well — arguably better than Zipf’s
Law — in matching the U.S. data. In particular, and as expected given Proposition 5,
the curve is slightly concave, as in the data. That is, large cities are too small, and
there are not enough small cities. Both simulations above have been computed for
the particular set of parameter values collected in the following table:
α = β = φBγ = εω δ τ g N ms d
1/30 .20 .01 .9 .95 10 1.02 0 0.5
,
where m and sd are the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution from
which the logarithms of the transitory shocks are drawn.












































Empirical studies have found that Zipf’s Law ﬁts the data well across a wide variety
of countries and over long periods of time. Therefore, ﬁtting the distribution for one
24particular country at a single point in time is not helpful in explaining this general
phenomenon. Instead, we want to focus on the robustness of the model’s predictions
to variations in the underlying key parameters. Proposition 6 tells us that one key
parameter is the standard deviation of industry shocks. Otherwise, the model seems
to be robust (not invariant) to all other parameter values9.T h i sj u s t i ﬁes our focus on
the standard deviations: the model has identiﬁed this parameter as the main source
of variation in Zipf’s Law coeﬃcients. We illustrate the urban distributions resulting
from diﬀerent assumptions on the standard deviation of temporary shocks in Figure
Five.








Zipf's Law and SD of transitory shocks













The ﬁgure starts with a standard deviation of 0.5, which implies a Zipf’s coeﬃcient
close to 1. If we increase sd to 0.9, the absolute value of the slope of the curve
decreases. That is, the dispersion of the city size distribution increases. The opposite
happens if we reduce sd substantially, say to 0.1. Soo (2003) ﬁnds that the coeﬃcients
9Except the discount factor, δ, that is related to the standard deviation, sd, via the period length,
which is calibrated to one year.
25in absolute value tend to be smaller (more unequal distribution of cities) in Africa,
South America and Asia than in Europe, North America and Oceania. Since most
of the developed economies are in the last group of continents, and presumably these
are the countries that experience less volatility of income (that is, smaller industry
shocks), we view the response of the model to changes in sd as identifying the source
of the diﬀerences in Zipf’s coeﬃcients observed in the data.

















































International evidence on urban structures implies bounds on observed Zipf’s Law
coeﬃcients. These bounds, in turn, imply bounds on admissible industry productivity
shocks. In the rest of this section we compare available evidence on this relationship.
Toward this, we ﬁrst select two countries that exhibit city size distributions that are
either extremely concentrated or extremely dispersed. The rank size relationship in
Belgium is very steep with a Zipf’s coeﬃcient of 1.59. The standard deviation of
transitory shocks that yields a city size distribution consistent with the Belgian data
is 0.31. The data and the simulation are presented in Figure Six.
26We perform the same exercise for a country that exhibits a very ﬂat rank size
relationship. Saudi Arabia’s cities are very distinct in terms of population sizes, with
aZ i p f ’ sc o e ﬃcient of 0.78. Figure Seven shows the simulation and Saudi Arabia’s
data10. The standard deviation used in the numerical simulation is sd =0 .73.
These two extreme cases give us a range of standard deviations that would imply
city size distributions consistent with what we observe in the data. The next question
is whether this range is in line with measures of productivity shocks by industry. The
model gives us a method to map observed Zipf’s coeﬃcients into standard deviations
of productivity shocks, given industry heterogeneity. As we have done so far, we
want to gauge the performance of the model without relying on particular forms of
industry heterogeneity that would help our theory, but obscure the main mechanisms
in play. Hence, we assume identical industries and solve for the standard deviation
that produces Zipf’s coeﬃcients consistent with the ones in the data. This produces
bounds on standard deviations that we compare with the evidence on productivity
shocks in the data. Horvath (2000) measures the standard deviation and persistence
of industry shocks in the United States for 36 industries11.
It is important to stress that this comparison puts a heavy burden on our theory.
To clarify, consider a situation where all of the standard deviations of productivity
shocks are inside the intervals implied by the range of Zipf’s coeﬃcients. That would
mean that if a country were to have industries that faced only the least variable
productivity shocks, it would still exhibit a Zipf’s coeﬃcient within the range of
international evidence. However, we know that all countries produce in a variety of
industries that face shocks that diﬀer in their standard deviations. That is, there is no
10There are a few countries that exhibit Zipf’s coeﬃcients that are higher or lower than Belgium
and Saudi Arabia. The reason we do not use them is that typically they have only very few cities.
For example, Guatemala, with 13 cities, has a Zipf’s coeﬁcient of 0.728, while Kuwait, with 28 cities,
has a Zipf’s coeﬃcent of 1.720. Using these countries would only improve the performance of the
model in the comparisons that follow.
11As the United States is the world’s largest economy, we will take this data to represent the
universe of possible productivity shock processes. In order to compare Horvath’s estimates with our
range of standard deviations, we ﬁrst need to map the standard deviations of persistent shocks into
standard deviations of transitory shocks.
27country that produces only in the most volatile industry. Therefore, it is impossible
for all industries’ volatilities to be inside the implied range. Conversely, if none of
the standard deviations were inside the implied range, it would be evidence against
our theory.
Table One presents these estimates and the percentage of industries in Horvath’s
study that lie inside the interval of standard deviations implied by the international
city size data. Perhaps surprisingly, given the nature of the exercise, half of the








I m p l i e db o u n d so nt h e
sd of industry shocks
Min Max
% of Horvath’s industries
inside the sd range
[Min,Max]0 .3080 0.7300 50
[10%,90%] 0.3850 0.6200 25
[20%,80%] 0.4200 0.5750 19
Similarly, we can use the evidence on the standard deviations of industry shocks
to construct bounds on Zipf’s coeﬃcients. In contrast with the previous exercise, the
fact that countries have diversiﬁed industrial structures implies that this exercise will
produce only loose bounds on the range of Zipf’s coeﬃcients that we should observe
in the data. Not surprisingly, as shown in Table Two, the Zipf’s coeﬃcient of every
country in our data set is inside the interval implied by the industry data. This
28remains true even if we focus only on those industries at the center of the distribution
of standard deviations.
Countries produce in a variety of industries and so the ability of the model to
explain the relationship between the urban structure and the variance of productivity
shocks lies between the bounds implied by these two exercises. This allows us to
conclude that the theory is performing well for most industries and countries. It is
also clear that in order to derive tighter bounds we would need to take a stand on
industry heterogeneity. This would require disaggregated data on industrial structure
for a wide set of countries. To the best of our knowledge, these data are not available
beyond a small sample of developed economies, and so we leave this empirical exercise
for future research.
Table Two
Distribution of sd of








%o fc o u n t r i e si n s i d et h e
Zipf’s coeﬃcient range
[Min,Max]0 .1444 6.2389 100
[10%,90%] 0.4535 3.6862 100
[20%,80%] 0.7675 2.1933 97
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed an urban growth theory that emphasizes the role of the accu-
mulation of speciﬁc factor across industries in determining the evolution of the urban
29structure. In this theory, cities arise endogenously out of a trade-oﬀ between agglom-
eration forces and congestion costs. It is the size distribution of cities itself, and it’s
evolution through the birth, growth and death of cities, that leads to a reconciliation
between increasing returns at the local level and constant returns at the aggregate
level. The urban structure of the economy prevents growth rates from diverging.
Moreover, this same urban structure displays many of the features observed in actual
city size distributions across countries and over time.
One of the advantages of the simple speciﬁcation we adopted above is that it
allowed us to identify analytically the standard deviation of industry productivity
shocks as the crucial factor determining cross-country diﬀerences in urban structure.
An empirical analysis of this parameter is, we believe, an important part of any
systematic empirical evaluation of cross-country diﬀerences in the size distribution of
cities.
O u rt h e o r ya l s op o i n t st od i ﬀerences in the eﬃciency at which cities are organized as
a potential explanation of the observed diﬀerences in total factor productivity across
countries. In our theory, we justiﬁed focusing on cities that are organized eﬃciently
by postulating the existence of city developers with access to a sophisticated range
of policy instruments. Restricting the range of policy instruments available to these
developers, for example by eliminating subsidies on human capital, would not aﬀect
the main results of our theory, but would translate into lower observed levels of total
factor productivity. The varying ability of local governments in diﬀerent countries to
use these policies is, potentially, an important determinant of income levels. These
policies are particularly important for cities, given that urban scale economies are
unlikely to have been fully internalized. We hope that future research will exam-
ine the empirical relationship between local government policy, urban structure, and
aggregate total factor productivity levels across countries.
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33APPENDIX
Competitive Equilibrium: Developers Problem
City developers aim to maximize rents net of subsidies paid to ﬁrms in order to
attract them, as well as factors of production, to the city. In order for workers to live
in the city, they must receive large enough wages Wtj/Ptj, such that, net of commuting
costs, their income Itj is at least as large as what they could obtain in any other city
producing in this industry. In order to attract ﬁrms, the returns to all factors have to
be at least as large as the rental rates of these factors after subsidies. Let Ptj,W tj,R tj,
and Stj be the price of output j and the rental rates of labor, physical capital, and
h u m a nc a p i t a lr e s p e c t i v e l yw r i t t e ni nt e r m so fs o m en u m e r a i r ec o m m o d i t y .T h e nt h e
problem of a city developer is to choose factor inputs in the city Ntj/µtj,K tj/µtj and
Htj/µtj, and subsidies to factors of production, Ttj,τk
tj,τh
tj, to maximize





















































































Proposition 4 (Exact Gibrat’s Law and Zipf’s Law) The growth process of city sizes
satisﬁes Gibrat’s Law, and the invariant distribution for city sizes satisﬁes Zipf’s Law,
if and only if one of the following two conditions is satisﬁed:
341. (No physical capital) There is no physical capital
³
ˆ βj =0or ωj =1
´
, and pro-
ductivity shocks are permanent.
2. (AK model) City production is linear in physical capital and there is no human
capital
³
ˆ αj =0 , ˆ βj =1
´
, depreciation is 100% (ωj =0 ), and productivity shocks
are temporary.
Proof. To show that the growth process of city sizes satisﬁes Gibrat’s Law, note that























which varies with j but is independent of city size, as E [ln(At+1j)|ln(Atj)] is inde-
pendent of ln(Atj).











= 2[ln(At+1j) − ln(Atj)] + 2[ln(Kt+1j) − ln(Ktj)],
but under these conditions
Kt+1j = Xtj = xjYtj = xjFjAtjKtju
ˆ φj
tj ,


















This process is independent of city size. Hence, if the conditions in either case one or
two are satisﬁed, city growth satisﬁes Gibrat’s Law.













This summarizes the growth processes derived for both cases above when ξj is i.i.d.
In order to prove convergence to a unique invariant distribution, we impose a lower
bound, fj, on the normalized process of city growth, sj (as in Gabaix (1999a) among
others). We study the invariant distribution that results as the lower bound tends to
zero. Speciﬁcally, let
















and Gj is the number of industries with the same ex-ante technology as industry j.
Since this argument holds for all industries in this group we suppress j in the notation
whenever it is clear by the context. Then
st+1 = stξ,
and letting ˆ s =l ns, this implies
ˆ st+1 =ˆ st +l nξ.
Hence if q(s) is the stationary probability of a representative city in the industry








The master equation for this probability distribution, above the lower bound, is of
the form




ξ (ξ)ˆ q(ˆ s − lnξ,t)dξ − ˆ q(ˆ s,t),
where qξ (ξ) denotes the probability of the growth rate taking the value ξ,a n dˆ q(ˆ s,t)
denotes the distribution of ˆ s at time t. Standard results (see for example Levy and
Solomon (1996) and Malcai, Biham and Solomon (1999)) then imply that the only
asymptotic stationary solution of the master equation is of the form
ˆ q(ˆ s)=Me
−ηˆ s,




Using the normalization Z G
f
sq (s)ds =1 ,
















































So far we have only considered the size distribution of representative cities within a
group. To get the size distribution of cities within a group, we need to consider that
each industry may have many cities. In particular, given ¯ sj and Nj for a group, an
industry with representative city size normalized to sj has Nj¯ sj/sj cities. The term
Nj¯ sj is constant across industries within a group, and hence the size distribution of
















which is a statement of Zipf’s Law for that group.
To obtain the size distribution of cities for the economy as a whole, notice ﬁrst that
the argument above implies that the cumulative distribution of cities in that group
is given by Q
City
i (ς>¯ ς)= ˆ Mi/¯ ς, where i indexes industry groups (assume the total
number of groups is given by ¯ G). Using this, and if λi is the proportion of cities in
















37which is a statement of Zipf’s Law for the economy.
Proposition 5 (Concavity) If conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed,
the growth rate of cities exhibits reversion to the mean. If productivity levels are




for all t,j), then there exists a unique invariant distribution of city sizes with thinner
tails than a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one.











= 2[ln(At+1j) − ln(Atj)] − 2
³













+2ˆ βj [ln(Kt+1j) − ln(Ktj)].
The only places that productivity shocks enter this equation is through their con-
temporaneous eﬀects on output and through the accumulation of past capital. If
we examine the equation for capital accumulation, recursively substituting, we ﬁnd,

















ωj +( 1− ωj) ˆ βj











































ωj +( 1− ωj) ˆ βj
´t−1¶
(1 − ωj).
If we take limits into the inﬁnite past, so as to remove the eﬀect of initial conditions,
this expression reduces to ˆ βj (1 − ωj), so that the weights on past productivity shocks
sum to minus one.
38From this we can conclude that if the city type is of average size, deﬁned as having
experienced a sequence of past shocks whose weighted average is E (lnA), then the
expected growth rate of the city is zero. By contrast, if the past shocks have a
weighted average greater than (less than) E (lnA), then the expected growth rates
are negative (positive).
To prove existence of a unique invariant distribution with thinner tails than a
Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one, we rely on the results in Propositions 4 and
5 of Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2004).
Proposition 6 If conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed, the standard
deviation of city sizes increases with the standard deviation of industry shocks.
Proof. If conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed, the variance of the



























































which is increasing in v, thereby proving the result.
If shocks are not i.i.d., a higher unconditional variance implies that V0 [lnKtj] is
larger, since
³
ωj +( 1− ωj) ˆ βj
´t−T
is positive for every 1 >ω j > 0 and 1 > ˆ βj > 0.
Higher unconditional variance implies that V0 [ln(Atj)] is larger for every t,a n ds o
the variance of city sizes increases.
39